Auto accident, a jury should hear the evidence

Whether someone acted negligently when driving is generally a question for the trier of fact.

The court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition as to whether defendant-Cooley's actions after he realized he had driven beyond the driveway into which he wished to turn and defendant-Quinn's actions in slowing or stopping in the travel lane of the road were reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's order granting them summary disposition and remanded for further proceedings. The case arose from a motor vehicle accident on a curved portion of a two-lane highway with a "substantial" paved shoulder. The weather at the time of the accident was clear and sunny, and the road was dry. The plaintiff-PR's decedent was driving her motorcycle northbound on the road. A succession of three vehicles was driving southbound on the road - a truck driver by Cooley, a van driven by Quinn, and a truck driven by defendant-Adams. After Cooley missed a right turn into a driveway, he pulled his truck onto the shoulder of the road. Seeing him slowing and pulling to the side of the road, Quinn either slowed her van or stopped it completely in the roadway or partially on the shoulder of the roadway. "In an effort to avoid colliding with Quinn, who he perceived to be stopped in the southbound lane of the roadway as he rounded a sweeping curve," Adams drove his truck across the double yellow center line into the northbound lane, colliding with the decedent's motorcycle and causing her death. Adams and his father (the owner of the truck) reached a settlement with plaintiff and were dismissed from the case. Cooley and Quinn successfully moved for summary disposition. Quinn argued that reasonable minds could not conclude that she acted negligently, and that her conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Cooley argued that the evidence did not show that he breached any applicable duty or that his truck was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. The court noted that like Adams, Cooley and Quinn "had a duty to operate their vehicles with the degree of ‘reasonable care that would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence under all the existing circumstance,'" and "in the manner prescribed by the motor vehicle code." In determining that there was no question of material fact that Cooley and Quinn fulfilled this duty, "the trial court impermissibly resolved questions of fact and determined the credibility of witnesses." The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there were questions of material fact as to "whether Cooley and Quinn operated their vehicles in a nonngeligent manner in the moments immediately preceding the accident." To determine if either Cooley or Quinn acted negligently, the trier of fact had to resolve outstanding issues as to the manner in which Cooley operated his truck upon passing the driveway and whether he pulled completely onto the shoulder of the road or remained in the travel lane, and whether Quinn appropriately stopped or slowed in the travel lane when approaching his truck. The court concluded that competent evidence was presented "from which it could be inferred that Cooley made a sudden or abrupt stop and/or that he was not completely off the travelled portion of the roadway when Quinn came upon his vehicle." There was also evidence from which a jury could find that Quinn responded to the presence of Cooley's truck other than by "‘easily slow[ing] her vehicle,'" and that the degree of her response was not warranted by the circumstances.