Discovery sanctions should be commensurate with damage to other side

Concluding that the trial court's sanction of barring defendant-ACIA from presenting any evidence due to its violation of discovery orders was "unjust and disproportionate," the court vacated the judgment for the plaintiff in this no-fault case and remanded for a new trial. Further, the court held that "evidence of agency rates constitutes a material and probative measure of the general value of attendant care services," including family-provided services. Thus, the trial court properly rejected ACIA's attempt to exclude evidence of the rates charged by healthcare agencies for attendant care services. However, the court concluded that the trial court should have presented one of ACIA's proposed special jury instructions because the instruction accurately reflected "that many factors are relevant to the reasonable rate issue" and it was consistent with Sokolek and Sharp. The jury found ACIA liable to plaintiff for family-provided attendant care services at a rate of $28/hour. The only dispute in the case was the "reasonable charge" for his parents' attendant care services. The court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting the sanction imposed. The trial court "specifically concluded that ACIA's conduct did not merit the drastic sanction of default." While the trial court labeled its order as "a lesser sanction," the court concluded that the trial court "actually imposed a sanction more severe and limiting than a default judgment would have been." If the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a default, ACIA would have been allowed to present evidence as to damages. The trial court's "actual sanction went further and precluded ACIA from presenting any evidence, even on the damages issue." While the trial court correctly found that ACIA violated its discovery orders, it clearly erred in finding that the discovery violations severely prejudiced plaintiff. Since the sanction was disproportionate and affected the whole trial, the court vacated and remanded for a new trial. This reopened the parties' debate on the valuation of family-provided attendant care services. ACIA argued that the rates charged by healthcare agencies for these services were irrelevant to establishing the reasonable rate for unlicensed, family-provided services. While ACIA relied extensively on Bonkowski, the court in that case "expressly acknowledged that its analysis of this issue was pure dicta" and the court disagreed with the suggestion that agency rates are irrelevant to establish family-care rates. The rates an agency charges for attendant care services "are not dispositive of the reasonable rate chargeable by a relative caregiver. However, this does not detract from the relevance of such evidence." As to other relevant evidence, the court concluded that evidence of the "overhead" incurred (or not incurred) by plaintiff's parents would be relevant in calculating a "reasonable charge," and a "parent who personally provides attendant care services also certainly bears an ‘opportunity cost.'" The court determined that ACIA's "Alternative B" proposed jury instruction recognized "the multi-faceted nature of the required calculation" to establish a "reasonable charge" for services and allowed "the jury to consider a broad spectrum of relevant evidence."