Auto accident is not slip fall

The court held that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act because her injury did not arise out of the use of a parked vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1). Since the circumstances of plaintiff's injury were not included in any of the exceptions enumerated in MCL 500.3106(1), the defendant-insurer was not liable to pay benefits under MCL 500.3105(1). Thus, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice while closing the passenger door of her vehicle. Plaintiff had placed a few personal items in the passenger compartment via the passenger door, stood up, and stepped out of the way of the door when she closed the door and fell. While she was in contact with the door of the vehicle at the time of her injury, she was clearly in contact with the vehicle itself, not with "equipment" mounted thereon. Thus, her injury was not "a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle . . . ." Further, before her injury, plaintiff had been standing with both feet planted firmly on the ground outside of the vehicle. She was entirely in control of her body's movement, and she was in no way reliant upon the vehicle itself. Thus, she was not in the process of "alighting from" the vehicle. At the time of her injury, plaintiff had already alighted. Also, because defendant did not owe benefits to plaintiff, its refusal to pay them was not unreasonable, and plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1).

Justices Kelly and Cavanagh dissented believing plaintiff was "alighting" from her vehicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(c) when she was injured. Thus, they opined that the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this issue. Believing that the Court of Appeals properly affirmed that decision, the Justices would have denied defendant's application for leave to appeal.

Justice Hathaway dissented and would have denied leave to appeal because she was not persuaded that the court should have taken any further action in this unique, fact-specific case that should have no precedential value.