Car accident Ambulance

Ambulance's have to be careful too. This ambulance sped through an intersection and caused an accident.

Rejecting the defendant-City's argument that the accident did not "result from" the defendant-ambulance driver's (Lewis) alleged negligence because the plaintiff's vehicle struck the ambulance, rather than vice versa, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the City summary disposition on this basis. Further, the court held that the trial court properly determined that there was an issue of fact for trial as to whether Lewis operated the ambulance within the statutory SOC governing the operation of emergency vehicles. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the City summary disposition. Lewis was dispatched regarding a domestic situation and traveling southbound in a residential neighborhood. "When he slowed the ambulance at an intersection, he saw plaintiff's vehicle traveling westbound on the cross street." He proceeded through the intersection without coming to a complete stop, believing there was enough distance between the vehicles for plaintiff to stop before hitting the ambulance. However, when the front of the ambulance was halfway through the intersection, "Lewis noticed that plaintiff was not attempting to stop. He then accelerated, hoping to quickly pass through the intersection and avoid a collision, but the front of plaintiff's vehicle struck the rear of the ambulance." Plaintiff asserted that she first saw the ambulance just after it entered the intersection, she tried to stop but was unable to do so, and slid into the rear of the ambulance. The court concluded that the City's "result from" argument stemmed from "an overly narrow reading" of Robinson and Curtis. "In neither Robinson nor Curtis were the government vehicles physically involved in the collisions. Thus, defendant's reliance on those decisions as attaching any significance to which vehicle struck the other is misplaced." Further, the City's argument was "at odds with the plain statutory language stating that government agencies are liable for injuries ‘resulting from' the negligent operation of a government vehicle. MCL 691.1405 makes no distinction between which vehicle strikes the other." The City also argued that MCL 691.1405 did not apply because Lewis operated the ambulance in accordance with the SOC governing the operation of emergency vehicles. While the plaintiff contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide this issue, the court held that it had jurisdiction because the effect of the trial court's ruling was to deny the City's governmental immunity claim. The court concluded that "MCL 257.603 and MCL 257.706(d), when read together, require that an emergency vehicle's siren be activated only when reasonably necessary to warn others of the vehicle's approach." Thus, whether Lewis activated the siren was not dispositive of whether he operated the ambulance within the statutory SOC. "Rather, the issue is whether Lewis activated the siren when its use was reasonably necessary under the circumstances." A rational jury could find, based on plaintiff's version of events, that the circumstances warranted use of the siren because she did not see the ambulance until she was unable to stop. On the other hand, a rational jury could find, based on Lewis's recollection of events, that activating the siren was unnecessary because plaintiff had time to stop but failed to slow down before striking the ambulance