Doctors cannot discrminate

Concluding that the Legislature did not intend the result that a doctor could refuse to treat any patient based solely on a characteristic protected under the ELCRA (including race) and yet avoid legal liability, the court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiff's discrimination action as to denial of IVF services to single women. Plaintiff contacted defendants-Grand Rapids Fertility & IVF (GRFI) and Michigan Reproductive & IVF Center and specifically asked if the clinics would provide IVF services to a single woman. Both facilities responded that they did not provide IVF services to single women. She sued both, alleging a single count of discrimination based on marital status under the ELCRA. "First and foremost," the court rejected the trial court's conclusion "that a professional, such as a doctor, may reject a patient or client for any reason, including one based on discriminatory animus against a protected characteristic." For purposes of summary disposition, GRFI stipulated that it is "a place of public accommodation" to which the statutory prohibition of discrimination applies. The parties disagreed whether GRFI was able to "[d]eny [Moon] the full and equal enjoyment of" its services because the denial was otherwise "permitted by law." Assuming that the statutory exception includes discrimination permitted under the common law, the court disagreed with the trial court's "overly broad interpretation of the consensual and voluntary nature of the doctor-patient relationship." GRFI correctly noted that a doctor-patient relationship is contractual and may only be established voluntarily and through the consent, either express or implied, of both the doctor and the patient. However, the cases GRFI cited describe the creation of a doctor-patient relationship in establishing the necessary elements of a medical malpractice claim and absolve a doctor of medical malpractice liability where the doctor did not explicitly or implicitly consent to enter into a doctor-patient relationship with the plaintiff. GRFI did not cite "a single case in which a doctor was allowed to use the consensual nature of the doctor-patient relationship to discriminate against potential patients based on protected characteristics such as race or marital status." "Civil rights acts certainly serve to prohibit doctors and medical facilities from refusing to form a doctor-patient relationship based solely on a protected status. A contrary interpretation would allow a doctor to follow his personal prejudices or biases and deny treatment to a patient merely because he is African-American, Jewish, or Italian." After Michigan's enactment of its civil rights legislation, "a doctor may only deny his or her consent to enter into a doctor-patient relationship with a potential patient based on legally permissible, nondiscriminatory reasons." The court found Lyons instructive in this regard. The current case posed the similar question of whether a doctor may refuse to enter into a doctor-patient relationship with a patient based on discriminatory factors in violation of the ELCRA. The court held that the answer was clearly "No." The court also rejected the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that GRFI discriminatorily rejected her as a patient. She clearly established that she was denied "enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" offered by GRFI, which stipulated to being "a place of public accommodation" for purposes of summary disposition. The only question remaining was whether she created a genuine issue of material fact that GRFI discriminated against her based on marital status. She argued that she was given disparate treatment from married women. She proffered direct evidence of potential discrimination from the e-mail messages she received from Dr. D, indicating that GRFI did not provide IVF treatment to single women. The trial court's error stemmed from its application of the shifting burdens standard of McDonnell Douglas. Reversed and remanded.