Injury in Medical Malpractice defined

The court held that the trial court erred in finding that the "original injury" for purposes of MCL 600.1629(1) occurred in Wayne County where the deceased plaintiff treated with the defendants-physicians and institutional medical centers and hospitals. Because the original injury occurred in Macomb County where the corporate registered office of a defendant was located, the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion to change venue. The decedent (M) was diagnosed with a serious heart condition shortly after birth in 1991. From 1991 through 2008, he treated with the defendants in Wayne County. In 5/08, defendant-Farooki prescribed an AED to detect abnormalities in M's heartbeat and to restart his heart after a cardiac event. On 8/11/08 he died during a car accident in Macomb County from "sudden cardiac arrest." His mother, acting as PR of his estate, filed this case against defendants in Wayne County, alleging that they breached their standards of care by failing to include an ICD in M's treatment plan to reduce his risk of sudden cardiac arrest. An ICD would have monitored M's heart rhythms and automatically corrected any detected abnormalities. MCL 600.1629(1) provides the venue guidelines for "action[s] based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death." While the statute does not define "original injury" the court has interpreted the term in medical malpractice cases. In Karpinski the court construed the venue statute and the wrongful death statute to define "original injury." The court explained that in a wrongful death case, the word "injury" in the venue statute "refers to the injury resulting in death, rather than the death itself." The court in that case also noted that "the Legislature intended to make the place where the injury transpires paramount for venue purposes." The issue here was whether the "original injury" in a medical malpractice case "involving a failure to recommend a course of treatment occurs at the time of treatment." In Taha, the court filled that gap, where the case explained that the injury that was the subject of the case "is the corporeal harm that results from the defendant's alleged failure to meet the recognized standard of care." The court concluded that the essential point of Taha was that the location of the alleged breach of the standard of care was not the place of the "original injury." In Dimmitt, the Supreme Court clarified that "a deficient treatment plan is only a potential injury until the plan proves ineffective and itself causes an injury." Thus, Dimmitt instructed that in a malpractice case, the location of an allegedly breached duty of care does not control venue. Rather, for venue purposes, the appropriate focus must remain on the location of plaintiff's injury. Here, M did not experience an actual injury until he suffered a sudden cardiac arrest and died. That was the "original injury," and it occurred in Macomb County. Reversed.