Leavi9ng car parked in sttreet may be compensable danger

Holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the vehicle with which the plaintiff collided did not pose an unreasonable risk of the bodily injury that occurred, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendant-insurer summary disposition in this action for PIP benefits. Plaintiff gave a friend a ride home on a borrowed snowmobile. While traveling across a frozen lake, he hit a bump and the snowmobile's headlight assembly fell out of its housing. Plaintiff and his friend looked for the headlight but could not find it in the dark. They continued on without it, and plaintiff dropped his friend off at home before continuing on to his home. As he was travelling on a residential street, plaintiff collided with the rear of a white van partially parked in the southbound lane of the two-lane street. Defendant insured the owner of the van. Plaintiff alleged that the owner of the van parked it in a manner that posed an unreasonable risk of bodily harm under MCL 500.3106(1)(a). Defendant successfully moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court noted that the Michigan Supreme Court held in Stewart that MCL 600.3106(1)(a) "does not create a rule that whenever a motor vehicle is parked entirely or in part on a traveled portion of a road, the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk." Factors "such as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked are material to determining whether the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk." Plaintiff noted that under MCL 257.671(1), a vehicle must not be parked "on a limited access highway" except in cases of emergency or mechanical failure. He also cited Hackley for the proposition that a parked vehicle protruding into the traveled portion of a roadway presents an unreasonable risk of injury. "However, the street on which the accident occurred was not a limited access highway. Rather, it was a residential street." Further, Hackley was decided before 11/1/90 and did not constitute binding precedent. "Hackley also does not engage in the analysis required by Stewart." Thus, the court did not find Hackley determinative and instead relied on the Stewart analysis. The "parked van was more than 300 feet from the nearest cross street and impeded only one-half of one lane on a lightly travelled residential road with a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. The accident occurred in the early hours of the morning, unlike the accident in Stewart, but traffic was not as heavy as in Stewart. Similar to Stewart, approaching drivers had ample opportunity to observe the van." This supported a conclusion "that drivers could react to and avoid the hazard it posed either by moving partially into the oncoming lane, if it was clear to do so, or by stopping behind the van until oncoming traffic cleared." Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in granting defendant summary disposition.